Aristotelian virtue ethics

Note that this is not a conclusive, or even necessarily correct interpretation. It is merely an attempt at summarising the provided script (that only touches on the topic briefly).

The Aristotelian represents one of the most important virtue ethics of the classical age. At its core, it views all actions as attempts at improving current circumstances, and thus realise something good. Aristotle considers at least some good to already be realised in the political sphere, and thus grounds his ethics within the political realm (in contrast to the preceding Plato, who had lost his trust in politics). In his view, the bliss (eudaimonia) that all action ultimately aims to reach is not found in any satisfaction by outward means, but only through a constant pursuit of a meaningful goal. Regarding the manner with which eudaimonia is realised, he thus finds three forms of life:

• First, the satisfaction of wants, which is individual, and corresponds to the instinctive behaviour of animals;
• second, actions to improve the state’s goals or interests, which are already more valuable, but still derive satisfaction from the outward (namely the recognition of others);
• third, theoretical understanding, the final stage, which becomes its own reward, and thus finally detaches from anything outward.

It should be noted that virtue (greek: aretē, the good)—or virtuous behaviour—in the Aristotelian sense, is considered a (best possible) way of partaking in the good, and is specific to a being’s nature. A virtuous horse thus reflects other qualities than a virtuous human, with the specific virtue of rationality. Furthermore, though fully virtuous behaviour reaches a maximum intensity in its own dimension, its underlying action lies between two extremes (lack and excess; e.g. a lack of courage is characterless weakness, while in excess courage turns reckless). It is a key hallmark of Aristotelian virtue ethics that it retains room in which to find this golden mean. Consequently, it is in essence an orientation aid for virtuous behaviour, but does not claim absolute knowledge about what is good, or right (as that always depends on the individual and circumstances).

As Aristotelian eudaimonia lies in the striving for an important goal, target choice (proairesis) occupies an absolutely central aspect. However, desires do not immediately become virtuous, as one’s wants are not limited to the possible, and there are also wishes without any ethical reference (e.g. such that do not lead to any particular action). Furthermore, reality itself is not an ethical topic. Rather, Aristotle’s proairesis contemplates goals that simultaneously entail the corresponding choice of actions to achieve its realisation. However, within these boundaries, the individual can indeed choose the goals and actions it pursues, and thus becomes responsible. Considering that the constant striving for a meaningful goal effectively implies many moments in need of decisions, virtuous behaviour essentially becomes habitual, and thus predictable. Consequently, the individual grows reliable, and also responsible for the traits acquired throughout life.

Virtues are further divided into two sections by Aristotle. The so-called dianoetic virtues concern the theoretical understanding or contemplation of virtues (thus, “endowments of rationality”), whereas ethical virtues deal with actually virtuous expressions of behaviour (and thus rational ways of life). An individual’s capacity for both groups can be expanded through learning (e.g. scientific reasoning) and practice (e.g. honesty). Aristotle generally considers virtues learnable, and sees the state responsible to formulate laws that encourage and foster virtuous behaviour.

Lastly, justice occupies a unique position within Aristotelian virtue ethics, and is divided into legal (iustitia legalis) and moral justice (iustitia moralis). Even though Aristotle’s ethics are embedded into the political, the law-abiding virtuous life is surpassed by moral virtue, which opens a perspective from which legislation can be viewed, questioned, and adjusted. This moral justice is again divided into general justice (iustitia commutativa), that treats all subjects equally (e.g. that all goods cost the same for everyone), and distributive justice (iustitia distributiva), which takes individual circumstances into account, and aims to compensate differences (e.g. income-adjusted taxes).